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On the afternoon of March 11, 2011, the greatest tsunami in Japan in the last thousand years
hit the coast of the Tohoku region. The notable thing about this tsunami was not only that it
killed more than 16,000 people, but also that it caused severe damage to nuclear power plants
in Fukushima, a prefecture where TEPCO（Tokyo Electric Power Company）had intensively
built nuclear power plants. The Fukushima nuclear disaster was evaluated as the highest level
nuclear accident（Level 7［Major accident］）by the IAEA, and themost dangerous nuclear power
plant accident since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. While this accident was reported all over
the world through the international media, France in particular reported on the accident with
deep interest. For the French, it was not merely a faraway disaster in the Far East, since at that
time, almost 80％ of French electricity production was supplied from nuclear energy, the larg-
est percentage in the world. France had over 50 nuclear reactors in operation nationwide. There-
fore, the Fukushima nuclear accident was regarded as a possible future catastrophe by many
French people.
The history of nuclear development in France dates back to the Second World War and the
post-war period. It was Charles de Gaulle―who orchestrated the résistance against the Nazi oc-
cupation during the war and was the first chairman of the provisional government of the French
republic（from June 1944 to January 1946）―who established the foundational organization for
the development of nuclear energy in France, the CEA（Commissariat de l’Énergie Atomique
［Atomic Energy Agency］）, in 1946. De Gaulle desired that France be an independent world
power through the possession of nuclear weapons. However, the role of the CEA was not lim-
ited to military affairs because the government hoped that the civil use of nuclear energy would
resolve France’s traditional economic problems. Lacking in natural resources, especially fossil
fuels such as petrol and coal, France had continually been a major importer of coal and oil from
the inter-war period, which had a negative impact on its balance of payments. In the mid-1950s,
the government had already developed a rough plan envisioning that nuclear energy would sup-
ply most of the nation’s electricity needs in the future. In fact, for France, this seemed to be the
only way to improve its energy dependence situation. There remained few sites that were both
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economically and geologically suitable for hydropower production, while the government also
decided to avoid reliance on thermal plants as the main source of electricity, since it would re-
quire increased importation of coal and oil. In fact, throughout the 1950s, the government made
great efforts―albeit in vain―to discover oil fields in metropolitan France, while the extremely
high financial cost of running Charbonnages de France（a national monopolistic company in
charge of national coal production and sales）led the French government to reduce national
coal production at the start of the 1960s. Meanwhile, under the auspices of the government, the
CEA steadily acquired scientific knowledge on the civil use of nuclear energy. Thus, from the
early 1960s, France succeeded in installing nuclear power plants and commercializing electric-
ity production step by step with Électricité de France（a national monopolistic company in charge
of electricity production and sales）. After the oil crisis in 1973 that accelerated the construction
of nuclear power plants, France became one of the most nuclear dependent countries in the
world. Supported by political leaders and bureaucrats, the French energy policy prioritizing nu-
clear energy continued stably. Environmental parties and groups were the only organizations
that officially protested against the policy. Public opinion kept silence on the national nuclear
policy.
However, the catastrophic accident in Fukushima drastically changed this situation by making
French people acutely aware of the potential dangers of nuclear power plants. In the immediate
wake of the accident in Japan, many nuclear demonstrations against the French nuclear policy,
under the banner of “Sortir du nucléaire”（“Abandon nuclear power”）, were organized nationwide.
Energy policy had become an even more controversial and political issue, because in France,
soon after the Fukushima nuclear accident, the presidential campaign started for the national
election in May 2012. The energy policy became one of the hottest issues in the presidential
campaign. Nicolas Sarkozy, and the Francois Hollande, the challenger from the Socialist Party,
were the two leading candidates. While Nicolas Sarkozy, the incumbent candidate from the UMP
was pro-nuclear and insisted on the importance of the nuclear industry for the French economy,
Francois Hollande, the challenger from the Socialist Party, was rather anti-nuclear and, in collabo-
ration with the European Green Party, he announced his energy policy to reduce the share of
nuclear power generation by 50％ by 2025. It is also remarkable that journalism played an im-
portant role in this issue and that we can find a clear cleavage between the journalistic types.
For instance, while Le Nouvel Observateur, a representative French news magazine, would con-
stantly publish follow-up articles on Fukushima and continue its critical attitude of French nuclear
policy, Le Point, another representative French magazine not only published articles on
Fukushima as frequently as Le Nouvel Observateur, but also sometimes criticized anti-nuclear
movements as irrational, insisting on the economic damage France would suffer from the abo-
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lition of nuclear power plants. This cleavage directly reflects the difference in political stance
of the main readers of the respective magazines.
In May 2012, Francois Hollande defeated Nicolas Sarkozy. In August 2015, he passed a law,
named the law on energy transition for the increase of green energy. The law announced a re-
duction in greenhouse gas emissions by 40％ between 1990 and 2030, an increase in the share
of green energy in the electricity mix to 32％ by 2030, a reduction in final energy consumption
by 50％ between 2012 and 2050, and a reduction in the share of nuclear energy in the electric-
ity mix by 50％ by 2025. In fact, in tandem with this law, France had already closed several nu-
clear reactors, though we can confirm some delay compared to the initial time schedule.
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